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ABSTRACT
Mixed jurisdictions that are a historical by-product of the
convergence of common and civil law traditions may give the
impression of entities with stable and fixed traits. Upon a closer
look however, this impression is found to be inaccurate. An
analysis of court judgements is the best way to evaluate how these
legal systems develop. This paper focuses on Maltese private law,
* Lecturer in Private Comparative Law, Faculty of Political Sciences,
University of Catania, Italy.
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which is firmly rooted in the French legal tradition. Some issues
concerning private law will be discussed solely because they are
significant examples of the relevance that judgements have for the
development of the system, notwithstanding the fact that the
doctrine of binding precedent is not followed in Malta. Through an
inquiry of specific issues not expressly provided for by the
legislature, one can see if the legal system has evolved in a way
which is coherent with the models that lie at its foundations or
from which, and in what way, it has departed from them. In the
case of Malta, foreign influences are incorporated to the extent that
they are consistent with the Maltese legal tradition.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper I will discuss how Court decisions may
change the law in a mixed jurisdiction such as Malta. After an
overview of the legal history of the system, I will address two
closely connected points. The first concerns gaps in written law, or
lacunae, and the ways in which they are filled by judges. The
second point concerns how general rules such as the concept of
‘good faith’ have been used by Courts to rule in situations that are
not expressly provided for by law. The difference between the two
points is one of degree, as in the first case the rule is created by
judges within a wide space, whereas in the second there are
provisions covering situations which are not expressly mentioned.
In the first case, judicial discretion has as its result the introduction
of a new rule. This approach allows a more detailed insight into
mixed legal systems and allows us to understand the sense in
which these jurisdictions can be classified as ‘mixed.’ In this
respect, the formation of the legal system as a mixed one is very
important.
From the outset it has to be said that the most significant
features of the Maltese system are: 1) the presence of codes; 2) the
absence of the doctrine of binding precedent; 1 and 3) the absence
of a theoretical approach to law in the sense that a doctrinal
1. However, many examples can be found in which certain important
judgements are followed very closely by Courts in later cases: a clear example
of this can be found in the field of tort law, as to the computation of damage, in
Butler v. Christopher Heard (Court of Appeal, December 22, 1967).
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formant nowadays is basically non-existent. 2 The ambit of this
study is limited to private law.
II. THE MALTESE LEGAL SYSTEM AS A MIXED JURISDICTION:
A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Malta falls among those systems resulting from the mixture
between the civil law family and the common law family, which is
a specific mix that is sometimes called ‘Anglo-civilian.’ 3 An
eminent scholar, in fact, has observed that within mixed
jurisdictions, these two legal traditions separately affect different
areas of law. English law affects public, commercial and
procedural law, while civil law affects the field of private law. 4
These two traditions do not give rise to a ‘melted’ legal
system, as is the normal result among nearly all legal systems, but
in fact, each tradition operates within a distinct field of the legal
system.
According to one of the most eminent Maltese private
lawyers, 5 public law, maritime law and company law are oriented
towards English common law whereas private law is based on a
continental model. The fact that the models underlying both
Maltese private law and public law are different has not been a
2. A foreign observer may be rather puzzled by the presence of two
elements, indicated above as no.1 and 3, that usually do not fit well together.
Usually, in codified systems academics serve the function of rationalizing their
legal system through the interpretation of written law and by pointing out the
flaws of the latter, as well as legal reforms that are necessary. However, in the
Maltese legal system academics do not play this role.
3. V.V. PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL
FAMILY (Cambridge University Press, 2001); J. Du Plessis, Comparative Law
and the Study of Mixed Legal Systems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 478 (Reimann & Zimmermann, eds., Oxford University
Press, 2006).
4. PALMER, supra note 3, at 8-9.
5. J.M. GANADO, BRITISH PUBLIC LAW AND THE CIVIL LAW IN MALTA,
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 195 (1950) (Maltese law has succeeded in making a
happy union between British public law and its own private law, which belongs
to the legal system derived from the Roman or the civil law. Even a cursory
examination of the Maltese Civil Code reveals its close connection with the
Code Napoleon, with the Italian Code and with other codes of Southern
European nations. The combination of these two laws has been a feature in
Maltese affairs for the last 140 years); see also, J.M. Ganado, Malta: A
Microcosm of International Influences, in STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED
AND MIXING 225 (Örűcű et al. eds., Kluwer Law International, 1996).
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significant hurdle for the efficiency of the Maltese legal system,
because both traditions are, “built upon an individualistic basis.” 6
As to maritime law, 7 the British model was adopted during
the first period of British rule, initially by establishing a ViceAdmiralty Court presided over by an English judge and, then by
adopting the Admiralty Courts Acts of 1840 and 1860, and the
Colonial Courts of the Admiralty Act in 1890, all of which clearly
influenced by British legislation. The adoption of the English
model brought into the Maltese system rules which were
completely foreign to its legal tradition. For example, the Merchant
Shipping Act of 1973 introduced maritime mortgages in a system
which, up to that point, had only recognized hypothecs as the
primary type of security interest. This was a particularly relevant
change because the hypothec, being a civil law security, favours
the debtor by requiring registration through a public notarial deed
and does not rise to the level of a possessory right, whereas the
mortgage favours the creditor and allows the mortgagee the right to
take possession and sell the ship without recourse to the courts.
In the field of carriage of goods by sea, the 1952 Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act is a carbon copy of its English counterpart.
Furthermore, in the fields of carriage of goods and marine
insurance, the Maltese courts also follow English sources of law to
solve disputed points of law. However, within these fields, the
application of the British model is not pure, and it is also of note
that contract of carriage and bills of lading are governed by
continental rules.
Some fields are jointly affected by civil and common law.
Within company law, for example, commercial partnerships en
nom collectif and en commandite are based on French and Italian
law, while limited liability companies follow English law, except
with regard to issues of dissolution and liquidation, in which cases
French law is followed. 8

6. GANADO, supra at note 5, at 201.
7. Id. at 223-224.
8. Id. at 243-244.
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III. A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF SOURCES OF LAW IN MALTA
Because Malta has become ‘mixed,’ as previously defined,
under British rule, it is necessary to understand how British law
was received in Malta and the effects it produced on the preexisting Maltese legal tradition. It is generally believed that, rather
than having been subsumed by British law, the Maltese legal
tradition has instead been preserved because of the significant
degree of autonomy the Maltese people enjoyed under British rule.
The Maltese legal élite has always supported the idea that the
Island was neither conquered, nor ceded, nor sold but that it chose
to be governed by the British Empire. 9
Before detailing some of the legal changes brought about in
Malta by British rule, some brief remarks are necessary to describe
the period prior to that time. The Knights of the Gerosolimitan
Order, also known as the Knights Hospitaller, had gained control
over Malta in 1530, and it was during this period that the first
corpus of purely Maltese laws was enacted. 10 Before their arrival,
Malta was a political appendage of Sicily and the laws enacted by
the Sicilian rulers also applied ipso facto to Malta. The model of
legislation was based on Roman law, and during the period when
the Knights were in power, which ended in 1798 with the arrival of
the French, the Code of Master de Rohan (1784) was of crucial
importance. A distinguished Maltese author has described this
code as “a cornerstone of our legal edifice” 11 for various reasons.
9. This position is clearly developed by P. DE BONO, STORIA DELLA
MALTA 382-384 (1898). As to court judgments, a clear
example of this attitude can be found in Cassar Desain v. Forbes (Court of
Appeal, January 7, 1935), reported in W.PH. GULIA, GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY
IN MALTA 128 (1974). The political aim lying at the basis of this position was
that of obtaining the acknowledgement on behalf of Malta of a status different
from that of an ordinary colony. On the contrary, the British government
considered Malta a conquered colony or part of the ‘settled colonies’ as those
founded by English people abroad which enjoyed wider autonomy. The British
government refused at first to recognize the status of colony sui generis to Malta
with the 1865 Colonial Laws Validity Act, which ruled the position of the
Constitutions of the colonies in the frame of the English legal system. The
Maltese position within the British Empire changed after the enactment of the
Maltese Constitution of 1921, see F. CREMONA, STORIA DELLA LEGISLAZIONE
MALTESE (1936).
10. See, H.W. HARDING, HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW IN MALTA (Malta
University Press 1950).
11. CREMONA, supra note 9, at 75.
LEGISLAZIONE IN
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First, it is the summa of the whole of legislation enacted during the
Knight’s rule, secondly because it was the basis of modern law
developed from the nineteenth century onwards, and finally,
because various institutions ruled based on this Code, which has
never been repealed, and form part of the laws still in force.
At its foundation, one can find clear indications of the
influence of Sicilian law and Roman Law, as indicated in the law
of persons, specifically regarding status, family maintenance,
dowry, succession, property, the laws of organization, procedure
and in the setting up for commercial causes of a special court
known as the Consolato del Mare.
The influence of Roman law did not end with the Knight’s
rule, and the civil code still in force today draws from Roman law
the fundamental taxonomies on which it is built. It is important to
note that in speaking of Roman law, we do not refer only to ‘pure’
Roman law, but also to Roman law modified by customs, feudal
law and, perhaps more importantly, Canon law, a Roman law that
can be called ius commune because it is common to most of the
continental nations.
Roman law has influenced Maltese law in several ways,
and not only gave Maltese private law its fundamental taxonomies,
but in the past also served another function, that of a
supplementary or suppletive law, to which recourse was made in
cases not provided for by Maltese law. 12 The Roman law as ius
commune is recognizable in many rules of the above mentioned
Code de Rohan dealing with specific proceedings, contracts, dowry
and wills. Further, under British Rule there were several cases that
were decided according to Roman law principles, most notably the
Steven’s case (1833) 13 and the Concorso di creditori della eredità

12. On the role of Roman law as ius commune in the evolution of Maltese
legal system, see HARDING, supra note 10, at 55.
13. Steven and Chiappe were indicted for forgery and for the writing of a
public notarial act of enrolment and were found guilty by the Court of Special
Commission. Stevens then presented a memorial in which he observed that the
Court was instituted to hear crimes punishable with death or life imprisonment
but which had no jurisdiction in cases where it was found that the offence
charged in the indictment against the accused did not merit either of the said
higher punishment. The case was remanded to His Majesty’s Criminal Court.
His Majesty’s Government in London, acting on this opinion, released Stevens.
Maltese Judges did not concur in this opinion because it was
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di Edward Watson case (1840). 14 More recently, recourse has been
made to Roman law in many other cases. 15 The function of Roman
law of regulating casi omissi has notably whittled down in modern
times. Nowadays, it still retains the function of source of
interpretation. 16
IV. THE ADVENT OF BRITISH RULE
AND THE PROCESS OF CODIFICATION
This, then, was the existing framework of law at the
moment in which the British Empire took control of Malta. The
British period in Malta started de facto in 1800. However, it began
de iure only in 1814. Malta, until 1814, had not been formally
annexed to the British Empire. A Royal Order of 1801 stated that
English laws and courts of judicature had no jurisdiction over
Malta, and Maltese law in primis, the Code de Rohan remaining in
force until annexation. Because of this, institutions were not
affected. The change of status from Protectorate to Colony was
effectuated some months before the Treaty of Paris, on October 5,
1813 through notice given by the British government to the
Maltese people. Thomas Maitland was appointed Governor of the
Island and legal reforms based on the English common law were
introduced concerning the organisation of courts, commercial law,
bankruptcy and the registering of vessels.
Since the main focus of this article is the development of
Maltese private law under British rule, due care has been paid to

contrary . . . to the common (civil) or Justinian laws by which
in cases not provided for by the municipal enactments the
decisions of criminal cases in these Islands are to be regulated
. . . and in fact, as has always been, and is now the practice
constantly observed from time immemorial in all the Tribunals
of Malta and Gozo, which of itself would constitute in these
islands a law of custom (common law) which is no less
binding than the written law.
14. In this case, the interest was declared usurious, and Roman legislation
(Lex 27 Cod.de Usuris) suspending the interest ‘ultra duplum’ was found to be
still in force in Malta.
15. See, Dr. Messina v. Galea, (1881); D’Agata vs. Drago, (1884); De Piro
v. Delicata, (1885); Zammit v. Scicluna (1864); Concorso dei creditori del Conte
Manduca (1897).
16. HARDING, supra note 10, at 73.
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the process of codification, given the importance that codes, and
especially the civil code, had in the evolution of the Maltese legal
system.
The process that led to codification is rather long and
complex. 17 It begins with the mission given by King George IV to
the British lawyer John Richardson in 1824 to enquire into the
administration of the law in Malta. This report was aimed at
determining which reforms oriented towards common law were
possible in Malta.
In 1831, King William IV appointed a Commission made
up of four British and three Maltese jurists for the drafting of civil,
commercial, and criminal codes and of codes of civil and criminal
procedure. Each code had to be drafted in Italian and to conform to
the most accredited foreign codes. In 1831, the Commission was
repealed and replaced by a different Commission. However, in
1843, that Commission was officially dissolved without having
done anything significant. Another Commission was formed which
was composed only of Maltese jurists, because the presence of
British jurists made it difficult for the new laws to be modelled on
continental legislation. This Commission also failed, and it was not
until after 1850 that the process of codification of law came to be
realized, finally to be accomplished in 1873.
The British Government gave to the Crown Advocate Sir
Adriano Dingli 18 the task of codifying Maltese law, and this article
focuses particularly on the Civil Code. Dingli was a profound
scholar of both Roman law and continental law, having spent a
long period in Bologna and Heidelberg. He chose to proceed
gradually by single ordinances, which afterwards were
consolidated within Ordinance VII 1868 relating to things,
promulgated on February 11, 1870, and in Ordinance I of 1873
relating to persons, promulgated on January 22, 1874. These two
Ordinances cover the whole field of private law, with the exception
of citizenship and intellectual property rights which were governed
by English law, and marriage, which is governed by Canon law.

17. For an interesting account on this topic, see, G. BONELLO, 5 HISTORIES
190 (2004).
18. For a portrait of Dingli, see J.M. Ganado, Sir Adrian Dingli, 1 L.J. 9
(1943).

OF MALTA: REFLECTIONS AND REJECTIONS
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The backbone of Dingli’s Civil Code is the Code Napoléon,
which was not only the most important model among those
employed for outlining its framework 19 but also a highly
significant source of law. In this regard, specific institutions and
rules were introduced into Maltese law through the influence of
French law, such as indivisible obligations, the relevance ipso iure
of legal compensation, the diligence of bonus pater familias as an
objective standard, the principle possession vaut titre and so on.
Furthermore, there has also been, as previously observed, a
remarkably widespread influence of Roman law covering the law
of property and succession, except in some parts of the Code
dealing with the acquisition of ownership of movable property, the
transfer of ownership following agreements and the effect of
partition. 20 Dingli made detailed notes regarding the foreign
sources of law he looked at. This manuscript gives precious insight
into Dingli’s methodology since it allows an understanding of the
conceptual background of the Civil Code. Some provisions were
completely new while others are deeply rooted in Maltese legal
customs.
From that time, the Maltese Code has remained one of the
most faithful codes to the original Code Napoleon when compared
with the civil codes of other civil law systems which have
undergone revision. In fact, the Maltese Code has remained fairly
stable.
V. LACUNAE AND JUDGE-MADE LAW
To have a more accurate idea of the way in which the
Maltese legal system has been influenced and developed through
case law, one has to examine some instances in which judges have
filled a gap in the law. The examples I will consider in the
following pages are related to the law of obligations and to rights
over things or iura in re. I will start from the field of property and
then briefly consider an example in tort law, that of moral

19. Apart from the French Code, other codes were consulted such as the
civil Codes of Austria, Parma, Two Sicilies, Canton of Ticino, and Albertino.
20. HARDING, supra note 10, at 40.
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damages. 21 I will finally turn to the issue of pre-contractual
liability. While the first two are examples of how courts deal with
lacunae because a statutory norm is absent and therefore a rule is
introduced through case law in the legal system, the latter is a
different example of how judges deal with general rules and
address cases that are not expressly provided for by written law.
As to the law of obligations, actio publiciana will be
considered. In the field of iura in re, the main division is that
between ownership and possession. The different protection
afforded by the Maltese Civil Code to owners and possessors is the
by-product of the sharp distinction between the two positions
based on substantive grounds. This distinction, deeply rooted in the
civil law tradition, is predicated on the fact that the owner has a
right over the thing, whereas the possessor, who is not also owner,
exercises a power de facto over it. This difference also generates
separate remedies.
Actio publiciana, which is not provided for by the Civil
Code, but admitted by judges, removes the requirement that the
owner demonstrates the proof of his right, and therefore blurs the
difference between owner and possessor.
Judge-made law also has added to the actions provided by
the Civil Code for the protection of ‘proprietary rights’ in this
remedy. Only actio rei vindicatoria is ruled as a petitory action
protecting the right of ownership. It must be kept in mind that an
action with the same name has been acknowledged in Roman law
since 67 B.C. An actio in rem given by the judge was the actio
praetoria to the buyer of a res mancipi, when the thing was
transferred not through mancipatio, which is the correct mode of
transferring those things, but through traditio which was used for
less valuable goods. Through actio publiciana, Roman law
protected the buyer from third parties claiming a right which may
be deemed incompatible, as if he had acquired the thing through
mancipatio. It is uncertain if, and to what extent, Maltese actio
publiciana is similar to the Roman law remedy with the same
name. It is still debatable whether in Maltese law this action
consists of a mitigation of the rigorous proof of ownership that
21. For a detailed treatment of this topic see the paper by Claude MicallefGrimaud in this same volume of the J. CIV. L. STUD.
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must be given by those claiming to be the owners for the upholding
of actio rei vindicatoria, or whether it is a completely autonomous
action from the actio reivindicatoria.
The first alternative would allow the plaintiff, who claims
to be the owner and who has acted with reivindicatoria, to change
his previous claim and act with actio publiciana, when not able to
prove his title of ownership by simply proving that his title is better
than that of the defendant under the so called theory of better
title. 22 Under the second option, the plaintiff could directly resort
to actio publiciana without being compelled to act first with rei
vindicatoria. However, it is difficult to find cases in which judges
are favourable to this second option. 23
It is worth citing two recent judgements discussing actio
publiciana where favour was shown for the first option. In Frank
Pace et v. Kummissarju ta’L-Artijiet (First Hall Civil Court,
February 19, 2004), the main issue discussed before the Court was
who had title to the land. A part of the land was occupied by a
company and another part by a public road. The plaintiff was
neither able to prove his title, nor that his title was better than
others claimants. His claim was consequently rejected both under
the label of actio reivindicatoria and under that of actio
publiciana. In Jane Spiteri v. Nicholas u Maria Concetta konjugi
Camilleri (First Hall Civil Court, November 20, 2006), there was
uncertainty about a portion of the property because the plaintiff
and the defendants had both bought property from the same seller.
The seller sold to the plaintiff in 1983 and the defendants bought in
1985. The seller’s contract of sale with the plaintiff, contained a
declaration regarding the part of property that was being
challenged, that it “is part of the roof of the property sold by me.”
This, however, for the Court was not sufficient for the plaintiff to
exercise actio rei vindicatoria. The Court accepted his plea on the
different grounds of actio publiciana because the title of the
plaintiff was better than that of the defendant.

22. It can be open to doubt if this theory as applied by Maltese courts can be
traced back to Roman law or rather it is influenced by common law doctrines
acknowledging the ‘better title’ rule.
23. P. Bezzina, The Actio Publiciana (LL.D. thesis, University of Malta,
2007).

248

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 4

The following example, taken from the field of tort law,
concerns a rule created by Maltese judges, notwithstanding the
absence of a true gap, concerning the relevance at law of moral
damages. In the Maltese Civil Code, there is not an express
provision concerning the issue of recoverability for moral
damages. 24 However, under a general rule stated in art. 1031,
“every person . . . shall be liable for the damage which occurs
through his fault.” 25 This provision does not limit the
recoverability of damages to a specific kind of harm, and could be
considered good grounds for an award of moral damages. To the
contrary, however, Maltese judges make recourse to art. 1045,
entitled “Measure of damages,” subsection 1, provides that:
The damage which is to be made good by the
person responsible . . . shall consist in the actual
loss which the act shall have directly caused to the
injured party, in the expenses which the latter may
have been compelled to incur in consequence of the
damage, in the loss of actual wages or other
earnings and in the loss of future earnings arising
from any permanent incapacity, total or partial,
which the act may have caused.
This grounds a restrictive rule of recoverability of moral
damages. 26 I will not attempt to delve into the rationale of this
restrictive rule that does not have support either in the literal
provisions on tort or in the French civil code used as a model for
the drafting of tort rules.
The interesting point is that while both instances are rules
made by Courts, in the latter, judges limit their rulings to the
24. R. Borg, Moral Damage: A Comparative Study (LL.D. thesis,
University of Malta, 2008); C. Micallef-Grimaud, The Rationale for Excluding
Moral Damages from the Maltese Civil Code: A Historical and Legal
Investigation (LL.D thesis, University of Malta, 2008).
25. Art.1032 states that “a person shall be deemed to be in fault if, in his
own acts, he does not use the prudence, diligence and attention of a bonus pater
familias.”
26. In the Maltese legislation, however, specific instances of recovery of
moral damage can be found in the Consumers Affairs Act, in the Press Act, in
the Promise of marriage law and in the Enforcement of intellectual property
rights (regulation) Act. A judge-made rule of recovery of this kind of damages
exists in human rights cases.
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restrictive rule concerning moral damages. They disguise the fact
that they have created new law and present it as the result of the
direct application of art. 1045.
VI. GOOD FAITH IN CASE-LAW
Under this paragraph some issues will be analysed relating
to the concept of good faith, which is widely debated among
scholars of the main legal systems of the western tradition. These
issues are interesting examples of how Maltese judges address
situations not expressly provided by the legislature through the
broad interpretation of existing provisions.
A. The Controversial Issue of Pre-Contractual Liability
Pre-contractual liability is not expressly provided for and
its existence is still highly controversial. 27 It is interesting,
therefore, to see how Maltese judges cope with the issue of
awarding damages for damaging conduct occurring during the
negotiations stage. The most frequent case dealt with by Courts
under the label of pre-contractual liability is that of the abrupt
interruption of negotiations. Maltese judgements have adopted two
opposite approaches to this issue. 28 In some cases, courts show
their disfavour of pre-contractual liability in the light of the
doctrine of the freedom of will, according to which before the
conclusion of contract no obligation can arise on behalf of the
parties to a negotiation. Damages can be claimed only if a contract
is concluded. 29 When this has not occurred individuals cannot
27. See Alfred Attard v. Paolo Xuereb (First Hall Civil Court, October 13,
2003); V.J. Bisazza, Precontractual Responsibility (LL.D. thesis, University of
Malta, 1971); G. Xuereb, A Comparative Study of the Theory of Precontractual
Responsibility IX ID DRITT L.J. 806 (1978): J. Scicluna, Pre-Contractual
Liability: Comparative Perspectives (LL.D. thesis, University of Malta, 2003);
and S. Vassallo, The Principle of Good Faith in the Negotiation and
Performance of Contracts: A Comparative Perspective (LL.D. thesis, University
of Malta, 2010).
28. For a clear analysis of the two approaches see, T. Mallia, Precontractual Liability in Malta, in LAW & PRACTICE 25 (2000).
29. “An obligation can only arise with the free and definite consent of the
individual and if the said individual did not so express his consent, he was not
bound.” Id. at 26.
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claim damages against the party who had interrupted negotiations,
because otherwise no one would negotiate for the fear of being
held liable for damages. 30
In other cases, judges have found for the victim of precontractual unfairness. These judgments are usually justified in one
of three ways. First, they may argue for the existence of precontractual agreements, 31 in the sense that although a final
agreement has not been reached yet, negotiations are so advanced
that a sort of intermediate agreement has been reached. Therefore,
the interruption of negotiations constitutes a breach of a
contractual duty. This approach, rather than expressly and directly
acknowledging pre-contractual liability as such, allows
recoverability for pre-contractual damages by treating them as
contractual damages. Alternately, they make recourse to tort law,
qualifying unfair conduct held during negotiations as an abuse of
rights, which is expressly provided for by art. 1030. 32 This latter
provision states that “any person who makes use, within the proper
limits, of a right competent to him, shall not be liable for any
damages which may result therefrom.” Reasoning a contrario, the
owner of a right is liable when he exceeds the boundaries of the
right, and in these cases, pre-contractual liability arises because the
party who acts in bad faith infringes upon the other party's
30. This is the rationale underlying Carmel Cassar v. Thomas Colin Ernest
Campbell Preston noe et (Commercial Court, November 1, 1971); Carmelina
Busuttil pro et noe et v. Salvatore Muscat noe et, (First Hall Civil Court,
October 28, 1998): this case is mentioned in Mallia, supra note 28, at 27.
31. Mallia explains clearly this approach:
[A] new general principle was introduced in the law. Not only
should contracting parties perform their obligations in good
faith, but the protection of the other party's legitimate
expectations became paramount. Thus, an agreement could be
inferred from deeds and attitudes, independently if consent, if
the other party legitimately and in good faith interprets those
deeds and actions as meaning an agreement has been reached.
Id. at 26.
32. This provision is drafted in a very general way. Its ambit of application
has been defined through case law. It was used in the field of the property to fix
boundaries between neighbours, in the field of abuse of power by public
authorities and also as limitation on the exercise of a contractual right, in the
field of human rights. For an example of the application of this doctrine to the
field of pre-contractual liability, see Bezzina noe vs Direttur tal-Kuntratti (First
Hall Civil Court, October 12, 2006; confirmed on Appeal, June 26, 2009), that
awards damages to the victim to the extent of negative interests.
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legitimate expectations. The tort approach is the approach that had
gained widespread success in several European countries during
the twentieth century. 33 Finally, the courts extend the ambit of the
provision of art. 993 of the Civil Code, which states that contracts
must be carried out in good faith up to the stage of negotiations.
Several judgements support this view. 34 The best way to
understand the different approaches to pre-contractual liability is
through examining case law, and the cases that follow are among
the most significant in this field. In Dr. Biagio Giufridda pro et
noe v. Onor. Dott.Giorgio Borg Olivier et, 35 the Maltese
government and a private individual entered into negotiations
concerning two different contracts, the first being a contract of
emphyteusis and the second a contract of financial grant for the
construction of a hotel. The government put an abrupt end to
negotiations. The other party, therefore, requested a judicial
declaration that the revocation was ineffective and specific
performance of the contracts mentioned above, but did not ask for
pre-contractual damages. Although the Court stated that agreement
on the essential elements of the contract had not been reached, it
stated the general principle that an unjust or capricious revocation
makes its author liable for damages incurred by the counterparty in
the measure of ‘negative interest.’ So in this case, the Court
implicitly admitted pre-contractual liability and used a well-known
German theory to quantify damages suffered by the plaintiff
although it did not qualify this form of liability expressly as precontractual. The reason which led the Court to find in favour of the
Government is that pre-contractual liability was not claimed by the
plaintiff and the contracts were not concluded with the defendant.
In Pullen v. Matysik, 36 the plaintiffs entered into
negotiations with defendants for the concession of the Hilton
33. Maltese courts have imposed particularly higher degrees of proof than
those required in other national Courts working in other European systems, J.M.
GANADO, AN INTRODUCTION TO MALTESE FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW 49 (2009).
34. GANADO supra note 33 at 50, quotes a number of judgments which are
on this position: Debattista v. J.K. Properties Ltd (Court of Appeal, December 7,
2005); Baldacchino v. Chairman of Enemalta (First Hall Civil Court, October
11, 2006); Scicluna Enterprises (Gozo) Ltd v. Enemalta Corporation (Court of
Appeal, May 2, 2007).
35. Court of Appeal, March 3, 1967.
36. Commercial Court, October 20, 1969.
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Boutique of the Malta Hilton. All the essential elements of the
agreement were fixed but the final contract was never sent and the
contractual relationship with the previous concessionaires was not
terminated. The Court found the defendants liable under the
heading of liability in tort, holding that the defendants had acted
abusively. This conduct on the part of the defendant, “amounts to
‘culpa’ in terms of art.1074 of the Civil Code which in turn renders
them liable because there was, “at least negligence or imprudence
on this part . . . when [t]he[y] assured the plaintiffs that they would
unfailingly have the boutique, when in fact they w[ere] not in a
position to give it to them.” As to damages, they were restricted to
the actual losses suffered by the plaintiffs and consisted of
expenses incurred and depreciation of materials, but did not
include lost profits.
In Elia Grixti v. Mark Grech, 37 the plaintiff stated that he
had agreed to look for an apartment for the defendant, an estate
agent, and on finding such an apartment, he was to inform the
defendant so that the latter would purchase it. Sometime after
having informed the defendant that he had found the apartment,
the plaintiff found out that, following a conversation between the
parties, the defendant had bought the apartment directly from the
owner. Thus, the plaintiff sued him on the grounds that the
defendant disrupted the transaction that he was about to enter into
with him. The Court, while stating that the remedy of damages is
generally awarded for pre-contractual liability when the party
withdraws capriciously or in bad faith, or the negotiations are in
such an advanced stage because there is agreement on the
essential elements of the bargain to create a legitimate expectation
on the conclusion of the contract, dismissed the action of the
plaintiff because none of the requisites for the action were met.
In Caroline Ebejer v. Joseph Frendo, 38 there was a promise
for the sale of land for which the buyer had given a deposit. The
seller mala fide was silent regarding the fact that he was only the
co-owner of the land and that therefore he could not transfer the
ownership of the land without the consent of the other owner. The
Court excluded the possibility of a transfer of the ownership, but
37.
38.

First Hall Civil Court, April 3, 1998.
Court of Appeal, April 18, 2002.

2011] THE ROLE OF JUDGES IN MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS 253
found for pre-contractual liability by the seller, if not expressly
qualified in this way, on the grounds of the abuse of rights.
Liability was therefore based on tort law rules.
In Café Bar (Malta) Limited v. Alfred Caruana, 39 a
company sought to employ a person, but before formal
employment, sent him to Holland to follow a training course.
When the worker came back to Malta he decided to return to his
previous employer. In this case, the contract of employment had
not been concluded. The company sued him for damages resulting
from travel expenses, which occurred before the contract of
employment was concluded, thus suggesting a theory of precontractual liability. The First Hall of the Civil Court and the
Court of Appeal, however, dealt with the issue on the ground of
contractual liability stating that a sort of agreement, different from
the contract of employment and concerning only the training
course in Holland, had been concluded and found for the liability
of the private party by awarding damages to the company for a
partial amount of the expenses incurred by the latter. Although a
final contract of employment had not been signed, a legitimate
expectation had been created towards the conclusion of contract.
The Court did not make express reference to pre-contractual
liability, nor there was any reference to good faith.
In Attard v. Xuereb, 40 the parties had agreed between
themselves to assign the property of the defendant on a contract of
lease to the plaintiff for use as a confectionery shop. All elements
having been defined, the contract had only to be signed. The
plaintiff took several people to see the tenement in order to carry
out works on it and applied for planning permission. The
defendant, after having refused to give the keys to the plaintiff
saying that the contract was not still concluded, entered into an
agreement with third parties notwithstanding the fact that the date
for the final contract with the plaintiff had been fixed. 41
The plaintiff claimed damages for expenses incurred during
negotiations. The Court stated that for pre-contractual liability to
39. Court of Appeal, May 24, 2002.
40. First Hall Civil Court, October 13, 2003.
41. It has to be clarified whether a previous date had been fixed, but the
contract could not be concluded because the plaintiff's wife, whose signature
was necessary, was not present.
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be established, the negotiations had to be terminated in order for
one of the parties to have acted with dolus. Damages would be
limited to necessary expenses incurred during negotiations and
would not include loss of future earnings. Although the Court
stated that the termination of negotiations was unjustified, it did
not award damages because the expenses incurred by the plaintiff
were not necessary.
Baldacchino noe v.Chairman tal-Korporazjoni Enemalta
42
et, concerned a call for tender for the supply of sulphuric acid.
The plaintiff received two offers and after notification that their
offer was declined, the company instituted a court action. The
Court admitted damages, holding that it is possible to award
damages prior to the creation of a contractual relationship, basing
its reasoning on good faith as a standard of conduct at the precontractual stage as well as in the conclusion of contract.
Presently, none of these approaches regarding the issue of
pre-contractual liability has widespread prevalence, and the
approach based on the theory of will has not yet been definitely
abandoned. However, what can be said is that allowing an action
for pre-contractual damages produces a restriction on the freedom
of the will of the individual, in as much as one can be held bound
towards another person when not tied by a contract, if the latter has
been damaged by having relied in good faith on the conduct of the
other party. This shift from the theory of will to the theory of
reliance has been explained in this way, “people began to abuse of
the will theory and juggle their consent to the detriment of the lone
individual consumer, who was easily led astray and had little
protection from the law.” 43
B. Good Faith in the Performance of Contracts as a Tool of
Redressing Contractual Obligations
The third approach followed by Courts regarding the
recoverability of pre-contractual damages based on the concept of
good faith can be seen as evidence of the continued favor for this

42. First Hall Civil Court, October 11, 2006.
43. Mallia, supra note 28, at 26.
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principle in general. 44 Pre-contractual liability is not the only
example in which judges make use of this principle, and it has
been recently considered in various situations, including being
used as a tool to redress the obligations taken by parties through
contract. This would seemingly lead to lack of good faith not only
in the case of fraud, but also in the case of inequitable behaviour.
In Pace v. Micallef, 45 the issue was the exorbitant measure of a
penalty clause and whether judges could reduce it. The Court
found on the basis of the principle of good faith in that the penalty
was disproportionate to the delays of which one of the defendants
was charged and reduced the amount notwithstanding the lack of
an express provision. The clause of good faith would impose an
evaluation of the behaviour of the parties in the light of what is
thought to be fair according to social standards, normi stabiliti tassocjeta, and to legal logic, logika guridika. In this case, good faith
was used by Courts to reduce the entity of the burden lying on the
defendant arising from the contract.
In Psaila v. Spiteri, 46 the concept of good faith was used in
a commercial partnership formed for the sale of beer and other
products by Simonds Farsons Cisk Ltd. The defendant, the
administrator of the commercial partnership, without the
knowledge of the other partner, concurrently accepted agency for
Coca Cola. The Court found that, without excluding the
defendant's liberty to commit to other commercial practices, it was
the nature of the contract between plaintiff and defendant to forbid
44. According to Teubner, good faith displays three functions: 1) expansion
and establishment of contractual duties such as the duties of performance, of
information and of protection; 2) limitation of contractual rights. This function is
deeply entrenched within the doctrine of abuse of rights; 3) transformation of
contracts, when there are supervening events producing imbalance of the
equivalence, or frustration of contractual purpose. The legal transplant of the
clause of good faith from civil law to common law systems is not easy because
the principle is linked in continental countries to processes of economic
production based on cooperation that are totally different from those featuring in
common law countries based on market competition. The transplant would have
as a result not the enhancement of cooperation but simply an increase of the
judiciary intervention in the sphere of individuals. See G. Teubner, Legal
Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law ends up in New
Divergences, in THE EUROPEANISATION OF LAW: THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 244 (F. Snyder ed., Hart, 2000).
45. Court of Appeal, June 15, 2001.
46. Court of Appeal, Commercial, February 12, 1965.
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other commercial activities that could damage the partnership.
Damages were awarded, but loss of profits was not included.
Good faith has also been used by Maltese Courts as a tool
to pierce the veil of separate corporate personality when a juridical
personality is used with the aim of committing abuses or
committing illegal acts. In Avukat Dr.Herrera et v. Tabone et
noe, 47 the defendants attempted to hide behind a company in order
to evade contractual obligations. This was considered an
infringement of the principle that all contracts must be performed
in good faith. In this case the defendant formed a company simply
to evade the obligations taken towards the plaintiff not to employ
employees from the plaintiff’s company. The Court of Appeal
found for the plaintiff and ordered the payment of the penalty
contained in the clause which was breached. In absence of legal
provisions, good faith can also serve as a source for ruling on the
duties and rights of the parties to a contract.
These concepts are also applied to contracts of insurance.
Although the Maltese insurance business is a highly regulated area
of trade, the law regulating insurance contracts inhabits a legal
vacuum. There is only one law concerning marine insurance
enacted in 1858 and later inserted into the commercial code, but in
any case, the Maltese commercial code cannot be considered the
source for the general regulation of contracts of insurance. In fact,
whereas the Maltese Civil Code is the general law applying in all
cases unless expressly excluded by a specific law, the Commercial
Code is specific law that is limited in its scope to regulating
“objective acts of trade” and situations involving traders acting in
the pursuit of their business. The acts of insurance are not
considered by Courts to be acts of trade, 48 so section 3 of the
Commercial Code cannot be applied to the contract of insurance in
general. 49 Trade practices cannot be considered the source of law
regulating the contract, so insurance contracts theoretically should
fall under the Civil Code, which does not include express
47. Court of Appeal, January 22, 1992.
48. To this regard, see Frendo Azopardi v Colborne England (Commercial
Court, October 2, 1907).
49. The Commercial code provides that “in commercial matters, the
commercial law shall apply. Provided that where no provision is made in such
law, the usages of trade or, in the absence of such usages, the civil law shall
apply.”
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provisions on that matter. Therefore, the source to deal with the
contracts of insurance has to be found elsewhere.
Courts have filled this gap by referring primarily to English
jurisprudence. From this case law, Maltese Courts have drawn the
doctrine of utmost good faith, and although English law exerts a
considerable influence on Maltese law, the latter is not a carbon
copy of the former. It must be stressed that, since the general
principles of Maltese private law have to be found in the civil
code, the doctrine of utmost good faith in Maltese law should be
interpreted in the light of the civil code. So although Maltese law
understands the duty of utmost good faith, this duty is rationalised
from the perspective of vitiation of consent, of error and fraud.
Furthermore, Maltese insurance law departs from English
law under various aspects such as the materiality of the
information, 50 the concept of error, 51 the extent of fraud and the
requirements of diligence and inducement. From the combination
of these doctrines, both parties, not only the insured, would be
subject to heavy contractual duties concerning the disclosure of all
the information regarding the subject matter of the contract but in
practice the party on which the burden rests in a more significant
way is the insured. The example of the contract of insurance is an
interesting example both because it shows the importance of good
faith but also because it reveals Maltese judicial attitudes regarding
the use and adaptation of foreign models to the Maltese legal
environment.
VII. CONCLUSION
At this point, some conclusions can be made. In Malta, the
important role of ‘system-builder’ is played by judges,
notwithstanding the absence of a doctrine of binding precedent. As
to whether or not private law presently follows continental law, the
short examination of the evolution of some areas of private law has
shown that it has not necessarily changed away from its continental
foundation. The way in which judges deal with the issues outlined
50. Zammit v. Micallef (Commercial Court, January 31, 1952); Tanti v.
O.F. Gollcher (Civil Court, April 30, 2002).
51. Briffa v. Camilleri (Court of Appeal, February 9, 2001).
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above reveals that they do not necessarily follow continental law,
exclusively, but rather are pragmatic. It is possible to find
references to civilian theories, but also to original solutions that are
deeply rooted in the Maltese legal tradition.
Maltese judges do not necessarily address private law
issues by making recourse to the same legal traditions which guide
the legal field to which the issue is related. Furthermore, foreign
law that has been accepted as a source of Maltese private law does
not always repeal Maltese common law.
One of the most eminent law scholars of the end of the
nineteenth century, Judge Paolo De Bono in his work on the
history of Maltese legislation, observed that the rule of Code de
Rohan concerning a situation which cannot be resolved with regard
to local laws so must be determined by application of common
law, was never repealed as to private law and therefore has to be
applied. Also, customs fall within the “local laws,” and are
interpreted in their widest meaning. They are acknowledged by
Roman and Sicilian law, and are also nowadays legally binding. 52
This passage has been quoted by later jurists many times and has
exerted considerable influence on them. In support of the
aforesaid, De Bono referred to parr.37, capo VIII, and 27, Capo
IX, Libro I of Code de Rohan, ruling respectively the ‘Supremo
Magistrato di Giustizia’ and the President of the latter in which
reference was made to what he considered as Maltese sources of
law. 53 But upon a more careful reading of these provisions, one
52. DE BONO, supra note 9, at 383. The original text in Italian reads:
Il precetto del codice de Rohan, che qualora una controversia
non possa essere decisa con una disposizione delle leggi
municipali, si deve avere riguardo alle leggi comuni, non fu
mai per le materie civili abrogata, e tuttora si applica. Sotto la
espressione leggi municipali, presa nella sua ampia
significazione, viene anche la consuetudine, la quale,
riconosciuta dal diritto romano e dal diritto siculo, continua
pure oggidì ad essere ritenuta come una norma giuridica.
53. Par. XXVII states that the President of the Supremo Magistrato di
Giustizia “userà ogni diligenza, perché fia a tutti con prontezza e celerità
possibile amministrata la giustizia, a tenore del prescritto in questa nuova
Compilazione di Prammatiche, ed in loro difetto da quello che preferivano le
leggi dette comuni; ed in affari marittimi, dagli usi e stabilimenti del Consolato
generale del mare, e ne'casi controversi dalle oppinioni de' Supremi e più
accreditati Tribunali.” In English this passage reads: “Will take every care so
that the administration of justice will be as most effective as possible, in
accordance to this legislation, and in the case of lack of an express provision,
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discovers that, when these provisions make reference to leggi
municipali, that is Maltese written law pre-existing to the
enactment to the Code de Rohan, leggi comuni, common laws and
as extrema ratio to opinioni abbracciate ne' supremi e più
accreditati Tribunali or judgements of foreign courts, they
probably do so with a different aim from that of the eminent
Maltese author. These provisions intend to avoid, or rather, to
reduce, the risk of an arbitrary, capricious and inefficient exercise
of the power of administering justice, so that the references are
aimed at individuating some binding criteria for judges. However,
De Bono goes much further by giving to the provisions, and
especially to the leggi municipali, a wider meaning which is
relevant not only for judgements but, more generally, for the entire
legal system. The aim of De Bono is to create a bar to legal
developments driven by foreign influences which are not coherent
with the fundamental principles rooted in Maltese legal history.
The key to understanding De Bono’s book is most probably
evidenced by the emphasis put on the degree of resistance by the
Maltese legal tradition to foreign influences. This is due to the fact
that the Maltese system has kept its own identity, notwithstanding
the fact that subsequent foreign powers have gained control of
Malta in the past. 54 We can say then that his ‘history,’ far from
being merely a neutral account of the legal changes that have
affected the Island, has a ‘political’ background. When he speaks
about French domination, he explains the reasons for its failure,
and bases his contention on the fact that the French people wanted
to impose their law through strength by challenging the role played
by the Church and through the introduction of reforms that,

according to common law in shipping business, from the usage of the Consolato
generale del mare and in controversial cases from the opinions of the Supreme
and most authoritative Courts;” par.XXXVII states that the judges of the
Tribunale Collegiato “né potranno servirsi di veruna potestà arbitraria, quante
volte non sarà regolata da quello che si dispone dalle leggi municipali, ed in loro
difetto dalle leggi comuni, e ne'casi controversi e dubbi dalle oppinioni
abbracciate ne' Supremi e più accreditati tribunal.” In English this passage reads:
“Cannot administer justice arbitrarily when their power is not ruled by the laws
of the Island, and in case of the absence of common law, and in controversial
cases from the opinions of the Supreme and the most authoritative Courts.”
54. The same aim inspired the work of A. MICALLEF, NOTES TO CODE DE
ROHAN (1843).
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although advanced for the time in which they were proposed, were
not in harmony with Maltese society. 55
In my opinion, Maltese judges also have this attitude. In
some cases, as previously discussed, foreign law has been
followed, while in others, an original solution has been adopted.
Even when reference is made to foreign models, this has not
produced an all-encompassing acceptance of the same models.
Judges have acted to make the external sources consistent with the
local legal framework. This could be a clear sign of a rooted
attitude tending towards the preservation of the legal tradition of
the island.

55. It could seem paradoxical that while French domination was rejected,
French legal culture was absorbed. The Civil Code is the most evident proof of
this.

